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An overview of the Pondicherry interpretation of quantum mechanics is presented.
This interpretation proceeds from the recognition that the fundamental theoreti-
cal framework of physics is a probability algorithm, which serves to describe an
objective fuzziness (the literal meaning of Heisenberg’s term “Unscha¨rfe,” usually
mistranslated as “uncertainty”) by assigning objective probabilities to the possible
outcomes of unperformed measurements. Although it rejects attempts to construe
quantum states as evolving ontological states, it arrives at an objective description
of the quantum world that owes nothing to observers or the goings-on in physics
laboratories. In fact, unless such attempts are rejected, quantum theory’s true
ontological implications cannot be seen. Among these are the radically relational
nature of space, the numerical identity of the corresponding relata, the incomplete
spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world, and the consequent top-down
structure of reality, which defies attempts to model it from the bottom up, whether
on the basis of an intrinsically differentiated spacetime manifold or out of a multi-
tude of individual building blocks.
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1 Introduction
Over the past five years, a new interpretation of quantum mechanics has emerged. After
a series of publications that have focused on various aspects of the evolving “Pondicherry
interpretation” [1–11], it is time for an overview.
Does quantum theory need an interpretation? In a wide-circulation opinion piece,
Fuchs and Peres [12] have claimed that it does not. Their actual claims, however, are
that “quantum theory does not describe physical reality” (original emphasis), and that
“[t]he compendium of probabilities represented by the ‘quantum state’ ρ captures every-
thing that can meaningfully be said about a physical system.” I am in full agreement
with these authors when they insist that a quantum state (including the “two-state” in-
troduced by Aharonov and Vaidman [13]) is nothing but a compendium of probabilities.
The objective fuzziness of relative positions and momenta is essential for the stability of
matter. An objective fuzziness requires objective probabilities for its description. And
a quantum state is an algorithm for calculating objective probabilities. In fact, the
mathematical structure of quantum theory follows directly from this characterization of
quantum states [7].
However, I disagree with Fuchs and Peres when they claim that quantum theory
fails to describe physical reality, and that the density operator captures everything that
can meaningfully be said about a physical system. I sympathize with their revulsion
against realistic construals of quantum states. The transmogrification of a probability
algorithm into an evolving ontological state cannot fail to generate pseudoproblems and
invite gratuitous solutions. But the claim that from the quantal probability assignments
we cannot “distill a model of a free-standing ‘reality’ independent of our interventions”
is a non sequitur and a cop-out. I therefore also sympathize with those who carry on the
search for such a model.
Physical science owes its immense success in large measure to its powerful “sustaining
myth” [14]—the belief that we can find out how things really are. Neither the ultraviolet
catastrophe nor the spectacular failure of Rutherford’s atomic model made physicists
question their faith in what they can achieve. Instead, Planck and Bohr went on to
discover the quantization of energy and angular momentum. If today we seem to have
reason to question our sustaining myth, it ought to be taken as a sign that we are once
again making the wrong assumptions, and it ought to spur us on to ferret them out. The
Pondicherry interpretation does just that.
2 Quantum mechanics, probabilities, and measurements
The fundamental theoretical framework of contemporary physics, quantum mechanics, is
a probability algorithm. This serves to assign, on the basis of outcomes of measurements
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that have been made, probabilities to the possible outcomes of measurements that may
be made. The inevitable reference to “measurement” in all standard axiomatizations of
unadulterated quantum mechanics was famously criticized by John Bell [15]: “To restrict
quantum mechanics to be exclusively about piddling laboratory operations is to betray the
great enterprise.” The search for more respectable ways of thinking about measurements
began early. Since the discovery of special relativity in 1905, physicists had become used
to calling them “observations,” and in 1939 London and Bauer [16] were the first to speak
of “the essential role played by the consciousness of the observer.”
Over the years, this red herring has taken many forms. To a few (e.g. [17]), it meant
that the mind of the observer actively intervenes in the goings-on in the physical world,
to some (e.g. [18, 19]), it meant that science concerns our perceptions rather than the
goings-on “out there,” while to most (e.g. [12, 20, 21]), it meant that quantum mechanics
concerns knowledge or information about the physical world, rather than the physical
world itself.
It is not hard to account for the relative popularity of the slogan “quantum states are
states of knowledge” [22]. The fundamental theory of the physical world is a probability
algorithm, and there is a notion that probabilities are inherently subjective. Subjective
probabilities are ignorance probabilities: they enter the picture when relevant facts are
ignored. Because we lack the information needed to predict on which side a coin will fall,
we assign a probability to each possibility. Subjective probabilities disappear when all
relevant facts are taken into account (which in many cases is practically impossible).
The notion that probabilities are inherently subjective is a wholly classical idea. The
very fact that our fundamental physical theory is a probability algorithm tells us that
the probabilities it serves to assign are objective. The existence of objective probabilities
(not to be confused with relative frequencies) is due to the fact that even the totality
of previous measurement outcomes is insufficient for predicting subsequent measurement
outcomes with certainty. The “uncertainty principle”—the literal meaning of Heisenberg’s
original term, fuzziness principle, is more to the point—guarantees that, unlike subjective
probabilities, quantum-mechanical probabilities cannot be made to disappear. If the
relevant facts are sufficient to predict a position with certainty, there aren’t any facts
that would allow us to predict the corresponding momentum. What matters are facts,
not what we can know about them.
Again, the very stability of matter hinges on the fuzziness principle. Ordinary ob-
jects have spatial extent, are composed of a (large but) finite number of objects without
spatial extent, and neither collapse nor explode the moment they are created. The exis-
tence of such objects is made possible by the objective fuzziness of their internal relative
positions and momenta [23], not by our subjective uncertainty about the values of these
“observables.”
What is the proper (i.e., mathematically rigorous and philosophical sound) way of
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Figure 1: The fuzzy position of the electron relative to the proton in various stationary
states of atomic hydrogen.
describing the objective fuzziness of the quantum world? It is to assign objective proba-
bilities to the possible outcomes of measurements . Take the familiar cloudlike images in
Fig. 1. Each image represents the fuzzy position of the electron relative to the proton in
a particular state of atomic hydrogen. Neither the electron nor the proton is shown. All
we see is a fuzzy position. Or rather, all we see is a cloud of varying density, representing
a continuous probability distribution: integrate the density of the cloud over a region like
the box inserted in the first image, and get the probability of finding the electron inside
if the appropriate measurement is made.
Now imagine that this measurement is actually made. It is an elementary measure-
ment, in the sense that it answers a single yes/no question: is the electron inside that
region? Before the measurement, the electron is neither inside nor outside, for if it were
inside, the probability of finding it outside would be zero, as would the density of the
cloud outside, and if it were outside, the probability of finding it inside would be zero, as
would the density of the cloud inside. After the measurement, the electron is either inside
or outside. In other words, the measurement creates a new state of affairs. If we want
to describe a fuzzy state of affairs as it is , without messing with it, we must describe it
counterfactually, by assigning probabilities to the possible outcomes of unperformed mea-
surements. Clearly, quantum theory’s inevitable reference to “measurement” has little to
do with “piddling laboratory operations.”
While the notion that probabilities are inherently subjective has induced many physi-
cists to believe that quantum mechanics is an epistemic theory, the falsity of the notion
that quantum mechanics is an epistemic theory has induced many other physicists to deny
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that the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is fundamentally and irreducibly
a probability algorithm. This, too, is a non sequitur arising from the classical notion that
probabilities are necessarily subjective. At present the physics community can be divided
into three factions:
The first—the majority—doesn’t care what (if anything) quantum mechanics is trying
to tell us.
The second embraces agnosticism. It asserts that we cannot describe the quantum
world as it is by itself; its features are forever beyond our ken. All we can usefully talk
about is the statistical correlations between measurement outcomes (synchronic corre-
lations between outcomes of measurements performed on different systems in spacelike
relation as well as diachronic correlations between outcomes of measurements performed
on the same system at different times).
The third insists that there must be a way of talking about the quantum world as
it is by itself, independent of measurements. This faction is split into numerous sects,
each declaring to see the light, the ultimate light. Go to any conference on quantum
foundations, and you will find their priests pitted in holy war. (My thanks to C. A.
Fuchs [24] for this observation.)
The agnostics and the priests both have a point and both are wrong. The agnostics
have a point in that nothing of relevance can be said without reference to measurements.
They are wrong in their belief that the features of the quantum world are beyond our
ken. The priests have a point in that it is indeed possible to describe the features of
the quantum world. They are wrong in their belief that these features can be described
without reference to measurements. The objective fuzziness of the quantum world requires
for its description assignments of probabilities to the possible outcomes of unperformed
measurements.
3 Ontological implications
Consider again the unperformed elementary measurement designed to ascertain the elec-
tron’s presence in, or absence from, the small boxlike region inside the first “cloud.”
Before the measurement, the electron is neither inside nor outside this region. Yet being
inside and being outside are the only relations that can hold between an electron and
a given region. If neither relation holds, this region simply does not exist as far as the
electron is concerned. But conceiving of a region R is tantamount to making the dis-
tinction between “inside R” and “outside R.” Hence we may say that the distinction
we make between “inside R” and “outside R” is a distinction that the electron does not
make. Or we may say that the distinction we make between “the electron is inside R”
and “the electron is outside R” is a distinction that Nature does not make. It corresponds
to nothing in the physical world. It exists solely in our heads.
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This illustrates a general feature of the quantum world. It imposes limits on the dis-
tinctions that are physically warranted, not only spatial distinctions (between inside and
outside) but also substantial distinctions (between this object and that object). Prob-
abilities are calculated by summing over alternatives. Each alternative contributes an
amplitude. In some cases we first square the amplitudes and then add the results. In all
other cases we first add the amplitudes and then square the result. Whenever we add
amplitudes first, the distinctions we make between the corresponding alternatives have
no counterparts in the physical world.
Because of the limits that quantum mechanics imposes on the objectification of spatial
distinctions, spatial distinctions are relative and contingent: relative because the differ-
ence between “inside R” and “outside R” can be real for a given object at a given time
and not have any reality for a different object at the same time or for the same object at
a different time; and contingent because the reality of that difference (for a given object
at a given time) depends on whether a relation (inside or outside) exists between this
object and that region. Since no material object ever has an exact position, this in turn
implies that the spatial differentiation of the physical world is incomplete. It doesn’t go
all the way down. If we mentally partition the world into smaller and smaller regions,
there comes a point when there isn’t any material object left for which these regions,
or the corresponding distinctions, exist. And this again implies that a model of the
quantum world cannot be built from the bottom up, on an intrinsically and completely
differentiated spacetime manifold.
It is odd that for three quarters of a century, the ontological and/or epistemological
status of the quantum-mechanical wave function Ψ has been the focus of a lively contro-
versy, while the ontological status of the points and instants on which Ψ depends, has
hardly ever been called into question. Virtually every published paper concerning the
ontology of relativistic quantum mechanics (a.k.a. “quantum field theory”) begins by
postulating the existence of an intrinsically and completely differentiated spacetime man-
ifold, despite the fact that quantum mechanics tells us that these points and instants exist
solely in our heads. As long as the objective existence of such a manifold is postulated,
it is safe to say that our attempts to beat sense into quantum mechanics are doomed.
The consequences of the limits that quantum mechanics imposes on our substantial
distinctions, are not less drastic. We are allowed to distinguish between this particle
and that particle only to the extent that particles have properties by which they can be
distinguished, and they have such properties only to the extent that the possession of such
properties can be inferred from the facts. As an illustration, consider an elastic scattering
event involving two particles lacking properties that could serve as identity tags. Which
outgoing particle is identical with which incoming particle? Quantum statistics implies
that the question is meaningless. The challenge is to learn to think about the quantum
world in ways that do not lead to meaningless questions. If we say that initially there are
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two incoming particles, one moving northward and one moving southward (say), and in
the end there are two outgoing particles, one moving eastward and one moving westward
(say), we cannot help asking that meaningless question. If, on the other hand, we say
that initially there is one thing moving both northward and southward, and in the end
there is one thing moving both eastward and westward, the meaningless question—which
is which?—cannot be asked.
In a more philosophical language, what I am saying is that, in the quantum world, the
concept of “substance” betokens existence but it never betokens individuality. Individu-
ality is strictly a matter of properties. If here you have a particle with these properties
and there you have a particle with those properties, what you have is not two substances
each with a set of properties but one substance with two sets of properties. This leads to
the following conclusions:
(i) Considered by themselves (out of relation to each other, out of relation to mea-
surements, and out of relation to the laws that correlate measurement outcomes), the
structureless constituents of matter are identical not merely in the weak sense of ex-
act similarity but in the strong sense of numerical identity. (The evening star and the
morning star are identical in this way.)
(ii) Quantum mechanics is inconsistent with any attempt to construct a model of
reality by assembling a multitude of distinct substances.
The quantum world thus can be built neither on the foundation of an intrinsically
differentiated spacetime manifold nor out of a pre-existent multitude of individual sub-
stances. Any adequate model of the quantum world has to be constructed from the top
down. What ultimately exists is one. Call it whatever you like. Matter and space both
come into being when this enters into (more or less fuzzy) spatial relations with itself, for
physical space is the totality of existing spatial relations (relative positions and relative
orientations), while matter is the corresponding apparent multitude of relata—apparent
because the relations are self -relations. This is about the simplest creation story that
can be told, and it is a straightforward consequence of our fundamental theory of matter.
4 The importance of measurements
The existence of fuzzy variables calls for a criterion for the possession of a property (by a
system), of a value (by a variable), or of a truth value (“true” or “false,” by a proposition
such as “the electron is in R at the time t”). There is a notion that probability 1
is sufficient for “is” or “has.” To see that this notion is wrong, let us ask why the
probability of finding a given particle in the union C of two disjoint regions A and B,
calculated according to the standard Born rule, is equal to the probability of finding the
particle in A plus the probability of finding the particle in B: p(C) = p(A) + p(B).
The answer would be self-evident if the particle’s position were not fuzzy. In that case
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the particle would be either in A or in B whenever it is in C, and the probabilities we
calculate with the help of the quantum formalism would be subjective. To see that the
answer is not self-evident, imagine two perfect (one hundred percent efficient) detectors
D(A) and D(B) each monitoring one of those regions. If both p(A) and p(B) are greater
than 0 (and therefore less than 1), it isn’t certain that D(A) will click and it isn’t certain
that D(B) will click. Yet if p(C) = 1 then it is certain that either D(A) or D(B) will
click. How come?
The answer lies in the fact that quantum-mechanical probability assignments are
invariably made on the (tacit) assumption that a measurement is successfully made:
there is an outcome. The existence of an outcome means that either detector clicks. So
there is no mystery here, but the upshot is that quantum mechanics gives us probabilities
with which this or that outcome is obtained in a successful measurement, not probabilities
with which this or that property, value, or truth value is possessed. Probability 1 is not
sufficient for “is” or “has.”
If probability 1 is not sufficient for “is” or “has,” then what is? As far as unadulterated,
standard quantum mechanics is concerned—no surreal particle trajectories a` la Bohm [25],
no nonlinear modifications of the Schro¨dinger equation a` la Ghirardi, Rimini and We-
ber [26] or Pearle [27], no extraneous axioms like the traditional eigenstate-eigenvalue
link [28] or the modal semantical rule [29]—the only condition available is to be mea-
sured. To paraphrase a well-known dictum due to Wheeler [30], no property (or value) is
a possessed property unless it is an indicated property—unless, that is, its possession can
be inferred from property-indicating events or states of affairs (a.k.a. “measurements”).
In other words, in the quantum world, properties and values are extrinsic rather than
intrinsic (the latter word signifying “possessed regardless of whether their possession is
indicated”).
The fact that measurements create their outcomes was most forcefully brought home
to us by Greenberger, Horne, and Zeilinger (GHZ) [31], who discovered a state of three
entangled spin-1/2 particles that is an eigenstate of the following variables: the product
σ1
x
σ2
x
σ3
x
of the x components of the three spins, and the products σ1
x
σ2
y
σ3
y
, σ1
y
σ2
x
σ3
y
, and
σ1
y
σ2
y
σ3
x
of the x component of one spin and the y components of the two other spins. The
corresponding possessed eigenvalues are −1 for σ1
x
σ2
x
σ3
x
and +1 for the remaining three
products. If the individual spin components were in possession of either of their possible
values (+1 or −1) regardless of measurements, the following equations would hold for
their possessed values
s1
x
s2
y
s3
y
= 1, s1
y
s2
x
s3
y
= 1, s1
y
s2
y
s3
x
= 1, s1
x
s2
x
s3
x
= −1. (1)
Multiply the left-hand sides of the first three equations to find that it equals s1
x
s2
x
s3
x
. The
product of the right-hand sides equals 1, implying that s1
x
s2
x
s3
x
= 1, in direct contradiction
to the fourth equation. So unless a (compatible) set of spin components are actually
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measured, no values can be attributed to them.
Why is it that physical variables have values only if, and only to the extent that,
values are indicated (“measured”)? Take positions. Since spatial distinctions are relative
and contingent, physical space is anything but an intrinsically differentiated expanse.
Neither regions of space nor positions exist “by themselves.” Philosophically speaking,
positions are properties, not substances; they exist only if and when they are possessed.
But properties are possessed only if their possession is indicated, and the possession of
the property of being in a region R can only be indicated if R, or the distinction between
inside R and outside R, is realized (made real) by a detector (in the broadest sense of the
word: anything capable of indicating the presence of something somewhere). A detector,
therefore, performs two necessary functions: to indicate the presence of an object in its
sensitive region R, and to make the predicates “inside R” and “outside R” available for
attribution. Much the same goes for any other measurement apparatus, not least because
every measurement outcome is ultimately indicated by the position of something like a
pointer: it serves to realize indicatable properties as well as to indicate them.
And why are certain variables incompatible? Because the corresponding properties
cannot be simultaneously realized . This is particularly clear in the case of spin compo-
nents. In the absence of an axis that is physically realized by a magnetic gradient, the
values “up” and “down” are undefined. Since the superposition of two magnetic fields
with different gradients yields a single magnetic field with a single gradient, only one axis
can be realized at a time.
If the points and instants on which Ψ functionally depends have no counterparts in
the physical world, what is the meaning of the spatial and temporal arguments of Ψ? The
wave function is one of the quantum-mechanical tools for calculating probabilities. It is
the appropriate tool when we assign probabilities on the basis of an earlier outcome of a
complete measurement. We provide two kinds of information: (i) the difference t− t′ be-
tween the physically realized time t of the measurement to the possible outcomes of which
probabilities are assigned, and the physically realized time t′ of the measurement on the
basis of whose outcome probabilities are assigned; (ii) a physically realized region R (the
small boxlike region above, or any region of the system’s configuration space). Without
this information, the wave function is an empty shell devoid of physical significance.
Having plugged in this information, Ψ gives us the probability of finding the electron
(or the system) in R given that the corresponding elementary test is successfully made at
the time t. Once we have this probability for all conceivable regions, we can calculate the
mean value, the variance, and the higher moments that characterize a fuzzy relative posi-
tion. Using the Fourier transform of Ψ, we can similarly compute the various moments of
the corresponding fuzzy momentum. And under certain conditions this gives us a com-
plete description of a fuzzy state of affairs. (The complete description of the fuzzy state
of affairs that obtains between successive measurements is given by the time-symmetric
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probability algorithm due to Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz [32], rather than by the
Born rule, which bases probabilities on earlier or later outcomes [2].)
5 Explanations or delusions?
Consider once again three spin-1/2 particles in the GHZ state. By measuring the x com-
ponents or the y components of two spins, we can predict with certainty the x component
of the third spin. By measuring the x component of one spin and the y component of
another spin, we can predict with certainty the y component of the third spin. And by
measuring the z component of one spin, we can predict with certainty the z components
of the two other spins. How is it possible to predict any spin component of any of the
three particles after subjecting the other particles to the appropriate measurements, con-
sidering (i) that the GHZ correlations are independent of the distance between the three
particles (in principle they can be light years apart), and (ii) that these measurements do
not reveal pre-existent values but create their outcomes?
Counter question: Why do the GHZ correlations seem impossible? If we believe, as
Einstein did, that “things claim an existence independent of one another” whenever they
“lie in different parts of space” [33], then such correlations are indeed impossible. Fact is
that the three particles, irrespective of the distances between them, are not independent
of one another. Fiction is that they lie in different parts of space. As we have seen, space
has no parts. If we insist on thinking of space as a self-existent expanse, to which spatial
relations owe their quality of spatial extension, quantum mechanics does not permit us
to think of this expanse as being divided. The spatial multiplicity of the world rests
on the existence of more or less fuzzy relations, rather than on the existence of spatial
parts. One might say, paradoxically yet to the point, that, as far as “space itself” is
concerned, there is only one place, and this is everywhere. Instead of separating things,
space (qua expanse) unites them by being devoid of any kind of multiplicity. However,
since being extended and being undifferentiated makes a rather paradoxical combination
of properties, it is much better to look on space, not as a self-existent expanse, but as the
totality of spatial relations that hold between material objects. Then one cannot even
conceive of “parts of space.”
We saw, moreover, that the quantum world has room for only one substance. Con-
sidered by themselves, the structureless constituents of matter are identical in the strong
sense of numerical identity. All existing relations are self-relations. How then could things
possibly “claim an existence independent of one another”?
It is one thing to dispose of misconceptions that make the peculiar nonlocal behavior of
quantum systems seem impossible. It is quite another to explain the quantum-mechanical
correlation laws. If these laws are indeed the fundamental laws of physics (and apart from
our dogged insistence on explaining from the bottom up, we have no reason to believe
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that they are not), then they cannot be explained the way Kepler’s laws of planetary
motion can be explained by Newton’s law of gravity. Only a law that is not fundamental
can be so explained.
Can we interpret the quantum-mechanical correlation laws as descriptive of a physical
mechanism or process? Where the synchronic correlations are concerned, this notion is
patently absurd. Alas, to many the absurdity of interpreting the diachronic correlation
laws as descriptive of some physical process does not seem to be obvious, despite the
preposterous consequences of doing so, such as wave function collapse or lack of relativistic
covariance and of gauge invariance.
As an algorithm for assigning probabilities to possible measurement outcomes on the
basis of actual measurement outcomes, Ψ has two obvious dependences. It depends
continuously on the time of a measurement: if you change this time by a small amount,
the probabilities assigned to the possible outcomes change by small amounts. And it
depends discontinuously on the outcomes that constitute the assignment basis: if you
take into account an outcome that was not previously taken into account, the assignment
basis changes unpredictably as a matter of course. Transmogrify Ψ into the description
of an evolving, instantaneous state of affairs, and you are faced with the mother of all
quantum-mechanical pseudoproblems: why are there two modes of evolution rather than
one?
While the real trouble with von Neumann’s formulation of quantum mechanics [34]
is that it postulates two modes of evolution rather than none, many believe that the
trouble with it is that it postulates two modes of evolution rather than one. Instead
of addressing the root of the disease—the transmogrification of a probability algorithm
into an evolving ontological state—they make matters worse by postulating a universal
quantum state that evolves deterministically at all times.
This postulate is inconsistent with the ontological implications of the quantal probabil-
ity algorithm. If the wave function represented something that evolves deterministically,
it would evolve in a completely differentiated time. Unitary evolution implies that the
world is infinitely differentiated timewise, whereas the quantum-mechanical correlation
laws imply that the world is infinitely differentiated neither spacewise nor timewise, as
the following will show.
Like the properties or values themselves, the times at which properties or values are
possessed must be indicated (measured) in order to exist. As detectors are needed not
only to indicate but also to realize positions, so clocks are needed not only to indicate but
also to make times available for attribution. Since clocks realize times by the positions
of their hands, and since exact positions do not exist, neither do exact times. (Digital
clocks indicate times by transitions from one reading to another, without hands, but
the “uncertainty” principle for energy and time implies that these transitions cannot
occur at exact times. [35]) Exact times therefore are not available for attribution. Like
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the existing spatial relations, the existing temporal relations are fuzzy. From this the
incomplete temporal differentiation of the physical world follows in exactly the same way
as its incomplete spatial differentiation follows from the fuzziness of positions.
There are several reasons, most of them psychological and none of them physically
warranted, why we tend to believe in the existence of an evolving instantaneous physical
state. And once we believe that there is such a state, it is obviously hard to avoid thinking
of the wave function as representing such a state, and of the evolution of the wave function
as a physical process.
For one, classical physics appears to be consistent with these notions. It therefore
deserves to be pointed out that even the idea that a classical dynamical law describes
(i) the evolution of a physical state and (ii) a physical process , rests on nothing but the
physically unwarranted transmogrification of an algorithm for calculating the effects of
interactions into a physical process. Take classical electrodynamics. It allows us to calcu-
late the effects that charges have on charges. The calculation involves two steps. (i) Given
the distribution and motion of charges, we calculate six functions, the components of the
electromagnetic field. (ii) Given these six functions, we calculate the effect that those
charges have on any other charge. And that’s that. The rest is embroidery, including
the belief that the unobservable electromagnetic field is a physical entity in its own right,
that it is locally generated by charges, that it locally acts on charges, that it physically
mediates interactions and propagates energy and momentum (which are construed as
some localizable kind of stuff), and that this explains how charges act on charges. If we
were honest, we would admit that all we have in classical physics is correlations that,
being deterministic, can be thought of as correlations between causes and effects. We do
not have the merest notion of how (through what mechanism or process) causes produce
effects.
Among the psychological reasons for our belief in an evolving instantaneous physical
state and the ensuing misconceptions, the following deserves to be mentioned: while our
successive experience of reality makes it natural for us to hold that only the present is
real, or that it is somehow “more real” than the future or the past, our self-experience
as agents makes it natural for us to hold that the known or in principle knowable past
is “fixed and settled,” and that only the unknown and apparently unknowable future is
“open.” None of this has anything to do with physics.
For one thing, it is impossible to consistently project the experiential Now into the
physical world. To philosophers, the perplexities and absurdities entailed by the notion
of a changing objective present or a flowing time are well known [36]. To physicists, the
subjectivity of a temporally unextended yet persistent and persistently changing present
was brought home by the relativity of simultaneity. The same is implied by quantum
mechanics, inasmuch as the incomplete differentiation of the quantum world rules out the
existence of an (evolving) instantaneous state.
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For another thing, the physical correlation laws (whether classical or quantum) know
nothing of a preferred direction of causality. They are time-symmetric. They let us
retrodict as well as predict. The figment of a causal arrow is a projection, into the
physical world, of our sense of agency, our ability to know the past, and our inability to
know the future. It leads to the well-known folk tale according to which causal influences
reach from the nonexistent past to the nonexistent future through persisting “imprints”
on the present: If the past and the future are unreal, the past can influence the future only
through the mediation of something that persists. Causal influences reach from the past
into the future by being “carried through time” by something that “stays in the present.”
This evolving instantaneous state includes not only all presently possessed properties but
also traces of everything in the past that is causally relevant to the future.
In classical physics, this is how we come to conceive of fields of force that evolve in
time (and therefore, in a relativistic world, according to the principle of local action),
and that mediate between the past and the future (and therefore, in a relativistic world,
between local causes and their distant effects). In quantum physics, this is how we come to
seize on a probability algorithm that depends on the relative time between measurements
and on the outcomes of earlier measurements, to transmogrify the same into an evolving
instantaneous state, and to think of its evolution as a physical process.
The bottom line: we have no reason to mourn the loss of our ability to interpret the
physical correlation laws as descriptive of a physical process (the evolution of a physical
state), inasmuch as the idea that we once had this ability is a delusion. We have lost noth-
ing. Instead, we have gained significant insights into the spatiotemporal and substantial
aspects of our world.
6 Quantum mechanics and reality
The extrinsic nature of physical properties and values appears to entail a vicious regress.
No value is a possessed value unless it is indicated, and a pointer position is no exception;
it has a value only because, and only to the extent that, its value is indicated by other
“pointer positions.” How, then, can a detector (in the broadest sense) realize a region R
(or the distinction between “inside R” and “outside R”)? Is it possible to terminate this
regress without invoking an extra-physical principle like consciousness? Indeed it is. As
we shall see, this possibility crucially depends on the incomplete spatial differentiation of
the physical world.
The possibility of obtaining evidence of the departure of an object O from its clas-
sically predictable position (given all relevant earlier position-indicating events) calls for
detectors whose position probability distributions are narrower than O’s. Such detectors
do not exist for all objects. Some objects have the sharpest positions in existence. For
these objects, the probability of obtaining such evidence is extremely low. Hence among
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these objects there are many of which the following is true: every one of their indicated
positions is consistent with (i) every prediction that is based on their previous indicated
positions and (ii) a classical law of motion. Such objects deserve to be called “macro-
scopic.” To enable a macroscopic object to indicate an unpredictable value, one exception
has to be made: its position may change unpredictably if and when it serves to indicate
such a value.
Decoherence investigations [37, 38, 39] have shown for various reasonable definitions
of “macroscopic” that the probability of finding a macroscopic object where classically
it could not be, is extremely low. This guarantees the existence of macroscopic objects
according to our stricter definition, which are never actually found where classically they
could not be. The correlations between the indicated positions of these objects are de-
terministic in the following sense: their fuzziness never evinces itself through outcomes
that are inconsistent with predictions that are based on earlier outcomes and a classical
law of motion. Macroscopic objects (including pointers) follow trajectories that are only
counterfactually fuzzy. That is, they are fuzzy only in relation to an imaginary back-
ground that is more differentiated spacewise than is the actual world. In the physical
world, there is nothing over which they are “smeared out.” So we cannot say that they
are fuzzy—nor can we say that they are sharp: “not fuzzy” implies “sharp” only if we
postulate the intrinsically and completely differentiated background space that does not
exist in the quantum world.
To terminate that seemingly vicious regress, we must be allowed to look upon the
positions of macroscopic objects—macroscopic positions, for short—as intrinsic, as self-
indicating, or as real per se. The reason why this is indeed legitimate, is that the ex-
trinsic nature of the values of physical variables is a consequence of their fuzziness. If
macroscopic positions are not manifestly fuzzy, we have every right to consider them
intrinsic—notwithstanding that they are at the same time extrinsic, for even the Moon
has a position only because of the myriad of “pointer positions” that betoken its where-
abouts. The reason why macroscopic positions can be both extrinsic and intrinsic is that
they indicate each other so abundantly, so persistently, and so sharply that they are only
counterfactually fuzzy.
Nothing therefore stands in the way of attributing to the entire system of macroscopic
positions an independent reality, and nothing prevents us from considering the entire
system of possessed relative positions or spatial relations (including the corresponding
multitude of material relata) as self-contained. What the extrinsic nature of physical
properties forbids us, is to attribute independent reality to an individual macroscopic
position, and to model the physical world from the bottom up. We are not entitled to the
belief that the macroworld is what it is because its constituents are what they are. The
“foundation” is the macroworld—the system of macroscopic positions, in which value-
indicating events occur as unpredictable transitions in compliance with the quantum-
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mechanical correlation laws. All other properties of the physical world (in particular the
properties of the so-called “quantum domain”) exist solely because they are indicated by
the goings-on in the macroworld (the so-called “classical domain”). As philosophers would
say, the properties of the quantum domain supervene on the goings-on in the classical
domain.
A fundamental physical theory concerned with nothing but statistical correlations be-
tween value-indicating events, presupposes the occurrence of such events. The philosphi-
cally most challenging problem is to understand how such a theory can be complete—how
it can at the same time encompass the value-indicating events. The solution of this prob-
lem calls for a judicious choice on our part: which substructure of the entire theoretical
structure of quantum mechanics corresponds to what exists? Independent reality can be
attributed consistently neither to an intrinsically divided “manifold” nor to a multitude
of microscopic constituents nor to an evolving instantaneous “quantum state” but only
to the macroworld.
The problem of making sense of quantum mechanics is often misconceived as the
problem of how a classical domain emerges in a quantum world. Some feel called upon
to explain how possibilities—or worse, probabilities [40]—become facts, some try to show
how properties emerge [41], and some wish to tell us why events occur [42]. Since the
quantum domain supervenes on the goings-on in the macroworld, and since independent
reality can be consistently attributed only to the macroworld, there is no “underlying
reality” from which the macroworld could emerge. Saying in common language that a
possibility becomes a fact is the same as saying that something that is possible—something
that can be a fact—actually is a fact. This non-problem becomes a pseudoproblem if the
common-language “existence” of a possibility is construed as another kind of existence—a
matrix of “propensities” [43] or “potentialities” [44, 45]—that transforms into the genuine
article (nonexistence proper or existence proper) by way of measurement. (Pseudoprob-
lems of this kind are bound to arise if one misconstrues a probability algorithm as an
evolving, instantaneous physical state.) There is no such matrix.
Nor is it possible to explain why events occur. As we observed in Sec. 4, quantum-
mechanical probability assignments are made with the tacit assumption that a measure-
ment is successfully made: there is an outcome. If quantum mechanics is our funda-
mental theoretical framework, and if every quantum-mechanical probability assignment
presupposes the (actual or counterfactual) success of a measurement (in the form of a
value-indicating event), then quantum mechanics cannot possibly supply sufficient con-
ditions for the occurrence of such an event. The events by which properties or values
are indicated, are uncaused . (While this implies that perfect detectors are a fiction, it
does not prevent us from invoking perfect detectors to assign probabilities to the possible
outcomes of unperformed measurements.)
So does quantum mechanics encompass the system of macroscopic positions, in which
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value-indicating events occur as unpredictable transitions? It does. The fuzziness of all
existing relative positions implies the incomplete spatial differentiation of the physical
world, on account of which the least fuzzy positions in existence are at the same time
sharp and the least fuzzy extrinsic properties are at the same time intrinsic. This makes
the attribution of independent reality to the system of macroscopic positions both possible
and inescapable.
Do the quantum-mechanical correlation laws account for the correlata which they
presuppose? Since value-indicating events are uncaused, they don’t. This is no more
a shortcoming of quantum physics than it is a shortcoming of classical physics that it
cannot explain why there is anything, rather than nothing at all. Physics is concerned
with laws, and hence with nomologically possible worlds—worlds consistent with the laws.
It would be preposterous to expect from it an explanation of why the actual world exists.
Quantum physics is concerned with correlation laws, and it would be preposterous to
expect it to account for the existence of the correlata. We have done our utmost if we
have demonstrated not only the consistency of the correlation laws with the existence of
correlata (which is trivial) but also the completeness of the correlation laws: they can
account for anything but the factuality of (value-indicating) facts. Many aspects of a
value-indicating event can be understood in terms of the deterministic correlations that
structure the macroworld, and everything else but the actual occurrence of such an event
can be understood in terms of the statistical correlations that structure the (supervenient)
microworld. The absence of causally sufficient conditions for the occurrence of an event
of type X does not preclude a complete theoretical analysis of events of type X. As we
have seen, our inability to formulate sufficient conditions for the occurrence of a value-
indicating event does not imply the incompleteness of quantum mechanics but is instead
a consequence of the incompleteness of the quantum world, in particular its incomplete
spatiotemporal differentiation.
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